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1Special Relativity and the Future:
A Defense of the Point Present
Abstract
In this paper, I defend a theory of local temporality, sometimes referred to as a point-
present theory. This theory has the great advantage that it allows for the possibility of an
open future without requiring any alterations to our standard understanding of special
relativity. Such theories, however, have regularly been rejected out of hand as
metaphysically incoherent. After surveying the debate, I argue that such a transformation
of temporal concepts (i) is suggested by the indexical semantics of tense in a relativistic
universe, (ii) when properly understood easily withstands the usual accusations of
metaphysical incoherence and (iii) leads naturally to a meta-philosophical position from
which we can understand and escape the increasing sterility of debates between radical
Parmenideans and radical Heracliteans in the philosophy of time.
§1 The Problem of Time in Special Relativity
From without the World, though all things may be forethought in music
or foreshown in vision from afar, to those who enter verily in Eä each in
its own time shall be met at unawares as something new and unforetold.
–J.R.R. Tolkien, The Silmarillion, p. 44
Among the many features that both classical physics and “common-sense”
attribute to time are the openness of the future and the role of time as a global “metric.”
More precisely, those of us not in the grip of a particular theory tend to believe both of
2the following. First, in some sense, the question, “What is happening right now on the
moon?” must have some determinate answer. Second, that the question “What will
happen to me ten years from today?” does not. In this paper, I argue that, although the
first of these beliefs is false, the second is true. Thus, I will defend a version of what has
been called a “point-present” theory of time.
More precisely, I will argue that given special relativity, not both of these
intuitions can be correct. Given special relativity then if time is global, the future is
closed or, equivalently, determinate. This is not new; it dates back at least to the Putnam-
Rietdijk-Stein debate of the late-1960’s. What is new is that I believe that we should
retain only the second and deny the first assumption. I claim that special relativity
provides us with good reasons for rejecting global time and points us towards an
independently plausible theory of the open future. However, the resultant theory also
requires a substantial re-evaluation of our temporal concepts in general and of those
metaphysical concepts connected to them. After recapping some reasonably well-known
history in the next section, I present the argument in three main stages. First, I introduce
an indexical semantics for tense and argue that the most plausible transition from
classical to relativistic concepts takes local or proper time along world-lines rather than
global coordinate time as fundamental.
Second, in the next two sections, I develop my positive account of the openness of
the future. The principle aim of §4 is to develop an account of relational indeterminacy,
which will provide us with a plausible account of the openness of the future. One region
of space-time P is relationally indeterminate relative to another region Q when the causal
past of Q fails to determine the state of P. This account of indeterminacy, which is
3distinct both from indeterminism and from failure of predictability, provides a plausible
account of the openness of the future in general. Most significantly, if we make certain
plausible and quite weak assumptions, namely that the state of a region of space-time
depends only on the past null-cone of that region plus its topological closure, then in
Einstein-Minkowski space-time, only that causal past is determinate relative to any point
of the space-time with the rest of the space-time being relationally indeterminate.
Moreover, in Einstein-Minkowski space-time, the indeterminacy of the future does not
depend on the deterministic or indeterministic structure of the particular causal relations.
From the perspective of contemporary debates in the philosophy of time, e.g.
presentism vs. eternalism or 3-D vs. 4-D, this position most resembles an eternalist, 4-D
perspective. I believe that the 4-dimensional space-time manifold is the basic spatio-
temporal entity and that the entire space-time and its contents exist, in whatever sense
space-times exist. However, perhaps the most fundamental philosophical consequence of
this position is that it illustrates just how inappropriate the Platonic metaphysical
structure of those debates is to questions about time. In the last section of the paper, I
begin to develop this anti-Platonist perspective, which I call neo-Aristotelianism from its
affinities to Aristotle’s account of time in Physics.
§2 A new look at some old history
Until the late 1960’s, even the advent of special relativity seems to have left these
two core intuitions largely untouched. While all of those paying attention would certainly
have admitted that global times, i.e., “planes of simultaneity,” would have to be
“relativized,” they seem to have been confident that any fundamental temporal features of
the world would be referred to these new, relativized times. The exception here is Kurt
4Gödel who recognized fairly early that global time was incompatible with relativity
theory(Gödel 1949). However, although Gödel recognized that relativity destroys the
possibility of objective global time, he continued to demand that objective temporality
must be global. Thus, Gödel argued that absence of global time in relativistic space-time
is sufficient to disprove the existence of time itself. Gödel thus became the first, as far as
I am aware, but not the last thinker to claim that relativity theory solves all philosophical
problems about time by dissolving them.
The next fundamental move was made, apparently independently, by Hilary
Putnam(Putnam 1967) and C. W. Rietdijk(Rietdijk 1966). Both argued that special
relativity implies that there can be no objective distinction between past, present and
future. Nicholas Maxwell resurrected this basic argument in the Eighties(Maxwell 1985).
In response, Howard Stein(Stein 1968; 1991) twice claimed that the argument rested on a
fundamental assumption which was itself inimical to, at least the spirit of, special
relativity–that assumption being that the boundary between the “real”(Putnam) or
“determined”(Rietdijk and Maxwell) past and present, and “unreal” or “undetermined”
future must be a plane of simultaneity, a global time. More precisely, Stein proved the
following theorem in his 1991 paper.
Stein’s Theorem: The only reflexive, transitive, and
Lorentz invariant relations between world-points in
Einstein-Minkowski space-time are the trivial relation, the
universal relation, and the relations of past time-like and
past causal connection.
5The fundamental consequence of this theorem is that the openness of the future relative to
the past for any region of space-time is, given special relativity, logically incompatible
with objective global temporal structure.
Stein’s theorem leaves us with three possible positions on time and temporality in
Einstein-Minkowski space-time. First, a very strong block universe or Parmenidean
position in which one insists on global times as a necessary condition for objective time
and simply accepts that there simply is no such thing. This position tends to be popular
with philosophers of physics and physics influenced metaphysicians who are often drawn
to block universe positions for other reasons as well. While such positions may be the
only remaining possibility, if the alternative defended below fails, they continue to have
the problems of plausibility and relations to empirical reality that have plagued
Parmenidean positions going back to, well, Parmenides. Second, one can insist on a
strongly Heraclitean position with a commitment both to the openness of the future and to
global times while denying standard special relativity and embracing, either some form of
neo-Lorentzianism, as with Michael Tooley(Tooley 1997), or branching space-times, as
with Storrs McCall(McCall 1976; 1994), as a replacement for special relativity. Such
positions suffer from at least two severe methodological problems; they seem both to get
the relationship between physics and philosophy backwards and to make it impossible to
see how to get to general relativity without the space-time formulation of special
relativity.
These objections are certainly not definitive, but they should be at least sufficient
to lead us to take the third alternative seriously; no matter how implausible it seems at
first glance. That third alternative is “point-presentism” or, as I prefer, local temporality.
6As a first approximation local time is the claim that proper time along my world-line is
the only and actual time that passes for me and that only my past null-cone and its
interior is determinate for me. Moreover, I claim that these are actual and objective
features of our existence as a spatio-temporal entity and not subjective features of our
awareness. Where this position is mentioned at all, it is rarely considered in any detail or
argued against. Instead, it is generally dismissed out of hand. The Introduction to
(Oaklander and Smith 1994) is typical here.1
My defense of local time involves two distinct projects. First, I must respond to
the specific objections to the theory. Those objections fall into two broad
classes–semantic objections and metaphysical objections. The semantic objections are
generally versions of Gödel’s intuition that time just is global; the existence of a single
time for entire universe just is a logical or semantic feature of what we mean by time. In
Section 3 I introduce an indexical semantics for tense and show that there is no logical
requirement that we retain global time when we replace the classical temporal order
relations with the relativistic order relations and that there are very good physical and
methodological reasons to avoid doing so. The metaphysical objections focus on the
status of regions space-like separated from the present. Since any theory of local time
must treat the space-like separated regions as indeterminate in much the same way as the
future time-like separated region, objections generally focus on the claim that treating
“merely spatially separated entities” as indeterminate would commit one either to
profoundly bizarre solipsism, in which only my present self exists, or to a bizarre
verificationism, in which the absence of an immediate causal connection to an entity
provides grounds to deny that it exists. In sections 4 and 5, I consider the status of the
7space-like separated regions in some detail and conclude that on a reasonable statement
of the distinction no such pernicious consequences hold.
However, I believe that these explicit objections are not the truly fundamental
barriers to the fair consideration of a local theory of time and temporality. What actually
drives the resistance is an implicit understanding that such a radical re-evaluation of the
nature of time–as contingent rather than necessary, relational rather than absolute and
local rather than universal- requires a nearly equally radical re-evaluation of cherished
metaphysical assumptions about what it is to be real, and thus what it is to do
metaphysics. The final section of the paper attempts to lay out the terms of such a re-
evaluation and renewal of metaphysics.
§3 Tenseless Time and Local Time
In recent years, several slightly different versions of token-reflexive or indexical
semantics for tenses have appeared in the literature. (See especially Mellor 1981; and
1986; Le Poidevin 1991; and Tooley 1997; in addition see the essays in Poidevin and
MacBeath 1993; Oaklander and Smith 1994) Thus, my goal here is not a general defense
of the new theory of time. Rather, I will introduce a particular schema for such a
semantics and indicate briefly some of the reasons why I prefer it. I will then deploy that
schema to the particular purposes of this paper: the nature of the transition from classical
to relativistic temporality.
The fundamental semantical puzzle about tensed sentences is the difficulty of
finding a schema that makes use only of the temporal order relations (earlier, later, at the
same time as) to account for the context dependency of tenses. The schema that I prefer
solves this problem by taking the truth of sentences in a context as the fundamental
8semantic feature of sentences, roughly following the treatment of demonstratives by
David Kaplan(Kaplan 1989). Thus, the basic meta-language for giving the tenseless
truth-conditions for tensed English sentences consists of a tenseless fragment of English
with ability to refer to and quantify over arbitrary regions of space-time, dates, and to
discuss the relevant geometrical relationships between dates, plus the following technical
machinery.2 Capital Greek letters will be used as names for tensed sentences of English.3
For example, the meta-language sentence, “Σ= ‘The first moon landing is today.’” says
that ‘Σ’ is a name of ‘The first moon landing is today.’ In addition, the language contains
both the function date from occupants of space-time to the region of space-time that they
occupy and the function ext, from terms in the object language to their extension. Thus,
consider the truth-conditions for:
Σ= ‘The first moon landing is today.’
Intuitively, it is clear that Σ is true if and only if someone used it on July 20, 1969. More
formally,
TC(Σ):
∀c Σ is true in c[ ]↔ date ext ' the first moon landing'( )( )⊆ day c( )[ ]{ }
Where c ranges over contexts. Let me give one more example. Consider,
Γ= ‘President Bush went to Iraq three weeks ago.’
The truth-conditions for Γ are given by:
TC(Γ)
€ 
∀c Γ is true in c[ ]↔
date ext 'President Bush's trip to Iraq'( )( )
is three weeks earlier than c
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
9While a full defense of this schema is beyond the immediate scope of this essay, it
has three advantages worth pointing out.4 First, even a quick glance at TC(Σ) or TC(Γ)
should disabuse the reader of any sense that there is some illicit appeal to tensed notions
at work. Both of them contain names for tensed sentences of English, but they certainly
do not contain any uses of such a sentence.
Second, the examples make particularly clear the way in which the characteristic
behavior of tenses results from changing relationships between the context of utterance or
evaluation and the dates of the subjects of the sentences. This is particularly useful in
clarifying the problems with a certain class of objections to tenseless accounts of time; a
class best exemplified by A. N. Prior’s “Thank Goodness That’s Over”(Prior 1959). In
this well-studied argument, Prior suggests that defenders of tenseless theories of time, de-
tensers, should be puzzled by certain apparently reasonable human attitudes. In Prior’s
example, given that a de-tenser believes that there is no intrinsic difference between a
headache at the time when we suffer from it and the same headache after it ends, he
suggests that a reasonable person should not feel relief only after the end of the headache.
Apparently, Prior is deploying a principle that, roughly, it is reasonable to change
our attitudes towards some entity only after detecting some change in the entity.
Unfortunately, for Prior, that principle is clearly false. There is at least one situation,
other than an actual change in an entity, in which it is rational to change our attitudes
towards that entity – when there is a change in our knowledge of the entity. Consider our
attitudes towards a political regime that we had supported because we believed that it
exemplified certain closely held political beliefs. We later come to believe that it does
not, and in fact never had, exemplified those beliefs, and we cease to support it. There is
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no change in the object under consideration, only in us, but it is certainly rational to
change from support to non-support towards it.
The case is similar with respect to Prior’s headache. For those of us for whom
headaches are merely temporary facts of life, we know that our headache will end and so
have a general feeling of relief for this fact, but we do not know when any particular
headache will conclude in advance of its conclusion, and thus, it is not rational to feel
relief for its ending until it has in fact ended. The case of the headache is actually stronger
than that above because in the case of the headache, there is a change in the real objective
relations that we bear to the headache, rather then a merely epistemic change in us. It is
appropriate to feel relief for the end of a headache only at times later than the headache.
Like all of our attitudes and feelings about something, the feeling of relief depends
primarily not on the properties that the thing possesses but on our relations to the thing,
and the change from the relation “is earlier than” to the relation “is later than” is a real
change in our relation to the headache.
I take this argument to be neutral between two distinct classes of theories of the
nature of temporally extended things, especially persons. One class of such theories takes
objects as distinct from processes and temporally extended events in their not having any
temporal parts. On these theories, a person, for example, is entirely at each “time” on her
world-line, while an event is distributed over its temporal extent. On the other class of
theories – genidentity theories – objects, like events, are distributed over their histories.
However, both theories must, it seems to me, take some notion of an object’s “being at” a
succession of “times” as a primitive of their explanandum. This is all that I need stipulate
for my account of the Headache Problem.
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Third, and most importantly for my purposes here, it makes it particularly easy to
see the advantages to restricting ourselves to local relativistic concepts, rather than their
global coordinate counterparts, for a relativistic theory of tense. To make the issues as
clear as possible, let us consider a simple present tense version of Σ:
Ω= “The first moon landing is happening now.”
In a classical context, the truth conditions for Ω are fairly straightforward. Ω is true in all
contexts, c,  such that (some temporal part of) c is simultaneous with (some temporal part
of) the first moon landing. When we move to special relativity, things are, of course, no
longer so simple. The transition confronts us with two possible choices. We can parse
“now” or “at the same time as” either according to relativistic definition of simultaneity
and relativize the truth-conditions for Ω to frames of reference, or we can parse it as
“here-now” and deny that stricto sensu Ω is true in any context that fails to intersect the
spatio-temporal region occupied by the moon landing.
It is obvious that nothing in the logic of the situation requires the global reading.
In a sense, this is sufficient to establish my point. If a theory has no logical or conceptual
impediment and has the advantage of salvaging our intuitions about the openness of the
future, it certainly seems to deserve a full and fair hearing, which it seems not to have
received to this point. However, the situation is better than that. In addition to its
advantage in allowing us to retain an indeterminate future in Einstein-Minkowski space-
time, this choice has two principle advantages, and no substantial disadvantages.  The
first principle advantage is methodological. The local time reading of Ω transfers
naturally to general relativity in a way that the global reading does not. In particular, this
framework allows us to make good sense of debates about the nature of time and of time-
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travel in universes with closed time-like curves and without any global hyperplanes of
simultaneity (cf. Gödel 1949; Earman 1995).
The second advantage is that once we embrace local time most of the
interpretative problems of special relativity drop away. In special relativity, the only
physically significant time is proper time. In a relativistic universe clocks measure only
proper time, and only proper time provides any natural measurement of the rates of
physical processes. These phenomena are as empirically well-confirmed as anything in
physics.5
None of this is new. What appears to be new is an insistence that we “bite the
bullet” so to speak. If proper time is the only kind of time that matters, then proper time
just is time. Moreover, if that is correct, then we must truly and consistently embrace the
consequences of that truth. Let me just briefly consider two of those consequences. First,
the coordinate system and simultaneity relation associated with an inertial reference
system is privileged only with respect to other coordinate systems. It may be
geometrically handy, but using such a frame does not give us access to anything about the
universe that we cannot equally well describe in any other coordinate system. Second, the
temporal distance between events depends on the path one takes between those events. In
the classic twin paradox case, neither twin’s path through space-time is privileged. If it
took Twin A 5 years and took Twin B 10, years, then that is what it took them. However,
and here is the fundamental point, this does not make the passage of time for either or
both of the twins a subjective rather than an objective matter. The fact of the time elapsed
along the two paths has nothing at all to do with the existence of the twins as conscious
beings; relativity theory says that we get the same result whether we send twin human
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beings, twin dogs, twin sets of atomic clocks or twin samples of radioactive material; and
every experiment we can come up with confirms that, in this at least, relativity theory is
correct and common sense is wrong.
§4 Relational Indeterminacy and the Open Future
Given the conclusion of the previous section, there is no logical or conceptual bar
to local temporality. However, the argument so far provides no direct grounds for
accepting that there is a substantive distinction between the past and the future relative to
each temporal element, whether global instants or local events. In this section and the
next, I argue that, given certain common and plausible assumptions and one plausible
way of characterizing the distinction between a closed past and an open future, we have
good grounds for believing in an open future in Einstein-Minkowski space-time. The
argument of this section and of the next proceeds in three stages. First, I introduce and
explicate a definition of the open-future vs. closed-past distinction. Second, I demonstrate
that, given certain standard assumptions, the past null-cone and its interior of each point
of Einstein-Minkowski space-time is closed and the rest of the space-time is open relative
to that point. Finally, I argue that this particular way of understanding the distinction
allows us to avoid the standard objections to point-present theories.
What would it be for some region of space-time to be open, as opposed to closed?
Intuitively it seems reasonably straightforward that such an open region must be, in some
sense, a locus of multiple possibilities. It must be the case that the region could be
occupied by any one of a number of different things; be the site of any one of a number
of different events; or, more generally, be in any one of a number of distinct states.
Unfortunately, even given a theory that specifies what the possible states of space-time
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are, this does not get us very far. In particular, without more specifications of the
relationships between regions of space-time, all of space-time is either trivially open or
trivially closed. Given no additional information, the state of every region of space-time
could be anything compatible with a consistent assignment to the remainder of the space-
time; everything is open. Alternatively, a complete specification of the state of space-time
clearly fixes the state of each region; everything is closed.
Therefore, any non-trivial conception of openness, or indeterminacy, must be
relational; a region must be indeterminate relative to the state of some other region of
space-time. Can we make this concept any more precise? I believe we can. Let us assume
that we have a theory with the following characteristics. First, it specifies the range of
possible states for space-time. Second, it specifies or allows us to infer a probability
structure on the theory so that we can specify the probability that any particular region of
space-time is in a particular state as follows. Take Ω as the previously specified set of all
possible states of space-time. <Ω, A, P> is a probability structure for the theory such that
A is the power set of Ω, and P is a probability function satisfying the usual Kolmogorov
axioms. We then read P(a∈A)=x as the probability that space-time is in one of the states
s∈a being equal to x. Then, each region R determines a partition, ΛR, of Ω such that
ΛR={λr| λr are the elements of A where R is in the same state r.}. Then, P(λr) gives the
probability that R is in state r, r≡R. Most importantly, for our purposes, we can specify
the probability that any R is in state r given that another region S is in state s as the
ordinary conditional probability P(λr|λs). Hereafter, for clarity, I will normally write this
P(r≡R|s≡S).
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Third, and finally, our theory must specify the relationships of causal connection
between the various regions of space-time, caus(R, S) such that the state of S could
causally influence the state of R. First, this allows us to define a partition of the space-
time, relative to any given region R, into the causal past, C(R), the causal present, P(R),
and causal future, F(R) as follows:
(4.1) ∀p,q (p∈R) & (q∈C(R))⇔causqp & ~causpq
 (4.2) ∀p,q (p∈R) & (q∈P(R))⇔causqp & causpq
 (4.3) ∀p,q (p∈R) & (q∈F(R))⇔causpq & ~causqp
It will also be useful to have a name for the entire region from which R is causally
accessible, A(R), the union of C(R) and P(R). In order to avoid pre-judging certain
apparently coherent positions such as the various version of neo-Lorentzianism in the
literature, it is important to remember that these regions are independent physical notions,
not the geometric ones that go by similar names. Secondly, we are now ready to say what
it is for one region of space-time to determine the state of another region, to define a
relation of determination between regions of space-time. We will say that:
(4.4) S determines R [det(R,S)] if and only if for all
possible states s of S, there exists a state r of R for
some region Q⊆S⊆A(R), P(r≡R|q≡Q)=1
 Finally, we can return to the question that opened this section, what would it be
for the future to be open? Given the above it must be that the future is open if it is not
determined, in the sense above, by the past. Which past? Given that, according to the
previous section, the future is defined relative to our changing space-time location, it
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must be relative to our past. Thus, define the following two concepts relational
indeterminacy and (relational) determinacy:
(4.5) Relational Indeterminacy (RI) =df. A point qo is RI
with respect to q1 iff there is no R⊆A(q1) such that
detqoR.
(4.6) Determinacy =df. A point q is determinate with
respect to a point qo iff that point is not RI to qo.
Therefore, we can finally state that the future is open, in the only sense that seems to
matter, if and only if it is relationally indeterminate to our changing space-time location.
In the next section, I will argue that given a standard and natural reading of special
relativity, future regions of space-time are, in fact, relationally indeterminate.
However, first let us examine these concepts a bit more closely. In the first
instance, we must distinguish relational indeterminacy from two other concepts with
which it is often confused–ontological indeterminacy or indeterminism, and predictive
indeterminacy.
(4.7) Ontological Indeterminacy (OI) =df. A point qo is
ontologically indeterminate if and only if there is no
R⊆[A(qO)-qO] such that detqoR.
This, or a closely related, notion of indeterminacy seems to be what Hans Reichenbach
relied on for his conception of the openness of the future. However, critics quickly
pointed out that this notion could not serve Reichenbach’s purpose. A point that is
ontologically indeterminate is always so. Thus, consider an indeterministic quantum
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measurement. Even if that measurement’s outcome is now in our past, it remains true that
the measurement’s own causal past does not determine its outcome, and thus this relation
cannot ground the difference between an open future and a closed past.6 However, we
will discover that the logical connections between relational and ontological
indeterminacy show that Reichenbach was wrong only to the extent that he took
ontological indeterminacy to be a logically necessary condition for becoming.
The second conception with which it is possible to confuse relational
indeterminacy is an essentially epistemic notion. This variety of indeterminacy results
from failures of information gathering or information utilization by particular observers:
(4.8) Predictive Indeterminacy (PI) =df. A point qo is PI
with respect to an observer O having information I if
and only if I is not sufficient for O to infer the state of
qo at q1.
The reader should note that in this definition, the indeterminacy arises from two distinct
kinds of failures on the part of the observer. First, predictive indeterminacy could arise
from a failure to gather sufficient information about a particular event. This failure could
be intrinsic to the kind of being that the observer is; for example, she gathers information
only via causal processes and there are no causal processes from the event to her location.
Alternatively, this failure could be accidental; for example, her eyes might not have been
open when light from the event could have reached them.
Second, predictive indeterminacy could arise from a failure to carry out
necessary inferences from information actually possessed. Again, this failure could arise
either from intrinsic or accidental sources. An intrinsic inferential failure might arise if
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the necessary inferences require the calculation of formally incomputable functions by
beings, apparently much like us, incapable of carrying out such inferences.7 An accidental
failure might arise from simple laziness.
The confusion of predictive indeterminacy with relational indeterminacy
generates much of the misunderstanding that leads to various charges that attempting to
connect the causal structure of space-time with becoming confuses metaphysical with
epistemological issues or invokes some form of verificationism.8 This arises particularly
because we are the kind of beings who do depend on causal processes for the information
we possess, and thus relational indeterminacy does lead to predictive indeterminacy.
Predictive indeterminacy serves in large part to explain our sense of becoming. Thus, as
with ontological indeterminacy, predictive indeterminacy has a role to play in the
explanation of becoming but a less central one than has sometimes been attributed to it.
Causal Past
of qo
Causal Past
of q1
O
q1
q0
Figure 1
Applications of Definition to Arbitrary Space-time
In order to examine some of the consequences of the definitions, consider figure 1
above. The curves intersecting qo and q1 mark off their respective (and arbitrary) causal
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pasts. The arbitrary shape of those regions indicates the independence of the definitions
from any substantive assumptions about causal connection. Note that C(q1) contains
C(qo). This allows us to make the following inferences from the definitions. First, qo is
determinate with respect to q1 since qo is in the causal past of q1. We can see that the state
of qo must be determinate with respect to q1, because a complete specification of the state
of the causal past of q1 includes a specification of the state of qo. Intuitively, even if qo is
ontologically indeterminate, q1 has direct causal access to the state of qo since by
definition causal processes can propagate from qo to q1. Next, consider the observer O,
whose world line is represented by the straight line in the figure. Even though qo is
determinate with respect to q1, qo can be predictively indeterminate with respect to O on
the assumption that all of O’s information results from the detection of causal processes
at q1 if, for example, no actual causal process propagates from qo to q1; or O is unable to
detect those processes; or O is unable to make use of knowledge about the state of qo
obtained from detection of those processes. Finally, if we assume for the moment that
only the complete causal past of a point could suffice to determine the state of that point
independently of the direct specification of the state of that point, then q1 is relationally
indeterminate with respect to qo, since C(qo) contains only a proper subset of C(q1)
These conclusions are instances of more general logical connections between the
definitions. First, we should note that any point, qo, relationally indeterminate to another
point, q1, is also predictively indeterminate for causally obtained information with respect
to that point. Given that a complete specification of the state of the causal past of a point
exhausts the possible knowledge of, or possible information possessed by, an observer at
that point, it is clear that no observer could possess sufficient information to infer the
20
state of a point relationally indeterminate with respect to that observer’s here and now.
Similarly, an ontologically indeterminate point, q1, is relationally indeterminate with
respect to all points, qI, such that q1∉C(qi). Clearly, if no specification of C(q1) is
sufficient to determine the state of q1, then neither will the specification of any subset of
C(qi) that does not contain q1.
Finally, it is worth saying something about how relational indeterminacy connects
with the classical problem of future contingents: the problem of the status of tautologies
of the form A∨~A, where A is a proposition about the future.9 In brief, I believe that
indeterminacy reveals itself semantically not at the first-order but at the second-order.
More specifically, A∨~A is a tautology and is true for the usual reason that one of the
components is true. However, I claim that not all English statements of this apparent form
are tautologies. Consider an entity, r, that could possess any one of a number of
incompatible properties, in the simplest case the property P and anti-P, which we can
represent, using polish notation, as NP.10 I claim that r is indeterminate with respect to P
in a particular model when the union of the extensions of P and NP is not the entire
domain of the model and r falls into the gap between P and NP. This allows us to retain a
classical semantics of propositions since in this case both ~P(r) and ~NP(r) are true. In
addition, this conception makes explicit the concept of “attribute indefiniteness,” as the
most straightforward understanding of indeterminacy.11
§5. Application of the definitions to Neo-Newtonian and Einstein-Minkowski
space-time
By themselves, the above definitions seem to add very little to these debates.
Almost all parties to the debate over the force of Stein’s theorem seem to agree that
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different relations of causation are appropriate for differing space-times.12 The
disagreements seem to be about the metaphysical cost and implications of varying the
causal connectibility relation in various ways. However, I claim that these definitions
allow me to show that we can have univocal concepts of determinacy and indeterminacy
whose extensions vary when we vary the relation of causal connection; that these
concepts have the expected and desired consequences given natural neo-Newtonian and
Minkowskian relations of causal connection, respectively; and, finally, that they can
ground a significant distinction between past and future in at least some space-times.
The first step in this process is to show how to apply these definitions in classical
space-time. To that end, we need a definition of the causal past in neo-Newtonian space-
time. Two aspects of neo-Newtonian space-time have natural and immediate
interpretations in terms of classical physics, the simultaneity structure and the affine
structure. The presence of instantaneous action at a distance determines the simultaneity
structure; all and only those time-slices of objects (or objects at a time)13 that can exert
gravitational force on a given object at a time are simultaneous with it. Newton’s first law
of motion, that force-free objects follow straight lines or affine geodesics in the space-
time, determines the affine structure. These two principles exhaust the physical
interpretation of neo-Newtonian space-time since they allow us to define in principle
methods for the measurement of the intrinsic metric features of the space-time, absolute
temporal intervals and absolute instantaneous spatial separation.14
Next, given the definitions 4.1-4.3, the simultaneity slices constitute the causal
present for each point on them. Given this, we can determine which points are causally
earlier or later than each simultaneity slice yielding a definition of the causal past as the
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shaded region in Figure 2. Given these assumptions it follows, first, that causal effects
can reach qo from all points below the plane of simultaneity, and no causal effects can
reach qo from points above the plane of simultaneity. Therefore, the results of the
previous section tell us that all points beneath the current plane of simultaneity are
determinate.
Given this we can consider the various ways that a point q1 could be RI to a point
qo (see figure 2). There are essentially three ways in which q1 could fail to be
Plane of
Simultaneity of q0
qo
q2
q1
1
Figure 2
Relational Indeterminacy in Classical Space-time
determinate with respect to qo. First, there could be a causal influence on q1 that fails to
intersect C(qo). Such a causal process would have to originate at infinity at a time later
than that of qo and reach q1 in a finite time. This is essentially the so-called “space
invaders problem” that bedevils all attempts to formulate determinism in the context of
classical space-time. Here I point out only that the problem disappears in special
relativistic contexts where we tend to postulate explicit limits on the rate of propagation
of causal influences.
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The second way in which q1 could fail to be determinate is if there is some point
(e.g., q2 in Figure 2) to the future of qo which is ontologically indeterminate and that has a
causal influence on the state of q1. Thus even if q1 is itself ontologically determinate,
there is no subset of C(qo) sufficient to specify the state of q1.  Third, q1 could itself be
ontologically indeterminate. What this demonstrates is that barring “space invaders,”
indeterminacy can enter a classical space-time only through the existence of ontological
indeterminacy, and only to the future of some point.
This fact about classical space-time combined with the supposed determinism of
classical physics has extremely important consequences in the philosophy of time. Here I
will focus on two of them. First, at least as far back as Laplace and Kant, this fact has
driven philosophers seeking to ground the apparent openness of the future away from the
physics of space and time and towards more radically metaphysical ways of approaching
the problem. Thus, since classical physics seems to bar any access to an account of
indeterminacy in terms of “failures” of causation, this has pushed philosophers to attempt
to account for the openness of the future by appeals, for example, to existence as the
relevant criterion. This also shows what was right about Reichenbach’s conception of
becoming. If we are committed to a classical picture of causal structure, then ontological
indeterminacy seems to be the only way to generate relational indeterminacy in the
universe and open up the future. However, since Augustine apparently defended such a
view 1300 years before the advent of classical physics, the apparent lack of alternatives
that seems to result from classical physics is certainly not the only reason philosophers
have had for defending an ontological conception of becoming. The implicit reasoning
seems to run as follows. If the future is both necessary and determined, then the only way
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in which it can be distinct from the past is in virtue either of existence, the ontological
view, or some uniquely temporal features of the world, the pure tense view. The problem
is, as we shall continue to see, that neither of these conceptions extends naturally to
Minkowski space-time.
We can now consider how the definitions of Section 3 apply to Einstein-
Minkowski space-time and provide a ground for real becoming. What we will discover is
that with a definition of the causal past appropriate for special relativity, Einstein-
Minkowski space-time comes equipped with a natural distinction between past and future
in terms of Relational Indeterminacy. Next, we will consider the connection between
Relational and Ontological Indeterminacy. I will argue that, given another source of
relational indeterminacy, becoming is independent of the existence of ontological
indeterminacy in the space-time. I then consider two objections to connecting this kind of
a theory to temporal becoming. The first objection, directed by Adolf Grünbaum against
Hans Reichenbach, is that failures of causal determination cannot ground becoming
because they do not allow for the necessary “flow of time.” The second objection, which
will be one of the topics of the next section, is the solipsism objection mentioned above.
All standard physical interpretations of Einstein-Minkowski space-time take the
causal past of each point as the past light-cone of that point and its interior (Fig. 4.3).
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Figure 3
Relational Indeterminacy in Einstein-Minkowski space-time
Given this definition of C(q), we can determine by inspection that any point not itself
contained in C(q) has points in its causal past not in C(q). The problem of the relational
indeterminacy of such points depends on the problem of how much of their causal past
must be contained in C(q) to determine them. Thus, consider a point, p∉C(q). If p is
ontologically indeterminate, then as above p is RI to q. If even the entire C(q) is
insufficient to determine p, then clearly no subset is. Next, we need to consider the status
of points that are not ontologically indeterminate. If C(p) does not itself contain any
ontologically indeterminate points, then any cross-section of C(p) will serve to determine
p, as long as all of the causal processes leading to p are Markov processes. In probability
theory, a discretely ordered process is a Markov process if, and only if, the probability of
the (n)-th element of the process conditioned on the (n-1) element is the same as the
probability of the (n)-th element conditioned on all previous elements. Equivalently, we
can say that the (n-1) element screens off (n) from all other elements of the process. For
continuous space-time processes, this translates into the dependence of p only on points
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infinitesimally close to p. However, C(q) does not contain even a complete cross-section
of  C(p), and therefore, there are points in C(p) not determined by C(q). From this we can
see that all such pare relationally indeterminate to q.
This conception incorporates the space-like regions relative to each point into the
indeterminate future. However, this assimilation is not complete; only the causal future
(the future light-cone and its interior) can be affected. What happens in special relativity
is that two different ways of thinking about the present that tend to run together in
classical space-times become forced apart. One way of thinking about the present is as
the region just now becoming determinate; in this way of thinking, we treat it as the
boundary of the future and like the future, still changing or becoming. This aspect of the
present has been emphasized in the previous paragraphs. However, the present has
another aspect that tends to assimilate it to the past. From this perspective, because it is
becoming right now, it is too late to do anything about it, just as it is with the past. The
space-like regions retain this aspect of the present, and it distinguishes them from the true
future. As the boundary between past and future, this expanded present shares some
features with both regions.
Perhaps the most important aspect of this situation to note is that once we treat
space-time as Minkowskian, the existence of real becoming no longer depends on the
existence of ontological indeterminacy. Once we add a causal arrow, the necessary
indeterminacy falls naturally out of the space-time structure. This is important because it
allows us to respond to one strand of Adolf Grünbaum’s objections to this kind of a
picture. In Philosophical Problems of Space and Time, Grünbaum presents an argument
intended to show that the failure of determinism cannot ground becoming. I take the
27
argument to be as follows: for any given event, either that event is or is not determined by
its own causal past. Whether to event is or is not so determined does not depend on what
the here and now happen to be. That is, what I have called ontological indeterminacy is a
paradigmatically tenseless fact about events and thus cannot ground becoming.
As we saw above, Grünbaum is correct as far as he goes. Ontological
indeterminacy cannot fill the role into which philosophers such as Reichenbach have tried
to force it. However, Relational Indeterminacy can. Relational Indeterminacy allows a
unique specification of the past and future relative to each point. Again, Grünbaum
complains that even so, such a distinction does not serve to pick out a unique now. Again,
I agree. However, I do not think that such a unique now is necessary for objective
becoming. The now is defined only relative to particular occupants of the space-time,
including human beings. However, it is an entirely objective, if contingent, fact about
those objects that they are where they are. Similarly, it is an entirely objective and
physical fact that a human life consists of a sequence of events ordered from earlier to
later. It is exactly the change from relationally indeterminate to determinate that is the
objective counterpart to the subjective sense of temporal passage noted by, e.g., Henri
Bergson(Bergson 1949) and Richard Taylor(Taylor 1992).15 Nevertheless, is this really a
theory of objective becoming? This is the topic of our final section.
§6 Conclusion: Towards a Neo-Aristotelian Metaphysics of Time
Let me recap the conclusions so far. I have argued (§3) that the semantics of tense
combined with the physics of relativity provide us with good reasons for adopting local
rather than global temporal concepts. Then, in §§4 and 5 I have argued that once we
adopt this local conception, we have a perfectly natural sense in which Einstein-
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Minkowski space-time supports a distinction between a closed or determinate past and an
open or indeterminate future. However, this claim has been subject to two principle
objections; objections which on the surface pull in different directions, but which I
believe actually flow from a common, but deep, philosophical mistake. Pulling in one
direction is a claim that I have not proved enough. On this objection, I have not provided
an account of an objective past-future distinction; I have merely accounted for the
mistaken belief in such a distinction. From the other direction comes the claim that I have
proved too much. In searching for the indeterminate future, so it is claimed, I have made
everything indeterminate and committed myself to some form of radical skepticism or
solipsism.
While it is relatively easy to see what is wrong with these particular objections, it
is more difficult to see what the problem is with the motivations behind them. This is
because these objections really flow from a meta-philosophical position so common as to
be largely invisible; this is the commitment to a conception of reality, call it the Platonic
conception, such that anything real must be real all the way up (or down, pick your
metaphor). Until we have a clear picture of how this commitment infects the philosophy
of time and of its pernicious consequences, we will never have clear understanding of the
nature or metaphysical role of time and temporality.
Let us first consider the two specific objections. Have I not simply proved that
becoming depends on the existence of human beings and human language and thus is not
a real feature of the universe? However, nothing in my account of the past-future
distinction depends on human subjectivity. Certainly if there are no human language
users, then there are no tensed statements in human languages. Nevertheless, the truth-
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makers for those statements might very well still exist. Tenses depend not on anything
about human subjectivity, but merely on our existence as a certain kind of spatio-
temporal entity. On this account it is just as true that my chair has a determinate past and
an indeterminate future as it is that I do. The only difference is that I can state that I do
and know that I do, but this is simply the tautology that only language users and knowers
can state or know anything. It may well be true that from some eternal non-
spatiotemporal perspective, a perspective that I can only just glimpse through
mathematical physics, the past-future distinction dissolves. But, until I can occupy that
perspective, not merely glimpse its existence, I am still here and now a being with a past
and a future.
However, the fact that I can glimpse that perspective and that this plays a role in
my account of temporality is important for understanding what my precise claims are and
avoiding the charge that I fall into radical solipsism or skepticism. The problem of event
solipsism is the most easily addressed. There are two aspects to the response. First, once
we are committed to the space-time perspective, we are committed to the existence of the
entire space-time, including the space-like separated regions. In whatever way the past
light-cone exists, so do the space-like wings at each point. However, this does nothing to
address the problem of the reality of the supposed occupants of the space-like wings.
First, our own past commits us to there being something going on in the regions space-
like separated from our here and now. Causal processes exist that intersect our own
causal process and pass out of our region of causal accessibility. We reasonably believe
that such processes continue to have effects in those regions just as we would expect. The
only difference is that the exact nature of those effects is not yet determined for us.
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As far as I can see, there is nothing strange about this. We should probably expect
from the discussion at the end of the previous section that statements about the space-like
regions relative to any particular here and now are assimilated to the kinds of claims that
we can make about the future, that is, to predictions. Moreover, we should be used to the
failure of our predictions at this point, to falliblism. What special relativity does is take
our fallibility usually attributed merely to our own subjective epistemic failures – to
Predictive Indeterminacy – and show us that sometimes that failure is not subjective but
objective, built into the world and not into us, and arises from true Relational
Indeterminacy.
This leads into the charge of skepticism. First, if philosophers have not yet
learned to distinguish falliblism from skepticism, it will take a better epistemologist than
I am to teach them. Second, if this is skepticism, it is of a rather atypical variety. The
classical skeptical arguments begin with our failures; we cannot distinguish dreaming
from waking; our perceptions can be in error and thus should never be trusted; and so on.
That makes this position a strange variety of skepticism because it begins with a claim
about the external world. It is based on a theory that starts with all of the things that a
classical skeptic mistrusts and invokes a sketch of a theory about causation that a
Humean skeptic would find entirely unjustifiable. That is, it is a positive claim about the
nature of the external world, not a negative claim about our capacities to know things
about that world. This indeterminacy is a fact about the world that tends to manifest itself
to us in terms of our epistemic failure, but the fact about the world and not the epistemic
failure is primary.
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Alternatively, we can think about the situation as follows. We believe that
skepticism is problematic because it seems to have certain pernicious consequences.
Philosophers search for ways around skeptical arguments because they prohibit us from
having something that we in fact seem to have, i.e. objective knowledge about the
external world. However, while I do not want to legislate language, calling the position
developed here a variety of skepticism seems misleading at best. This is because my
position does not have the kind of pernicious consequences usually attributed to
skepticism. It cannot prevent us from having objective knowledge of the external world
because it begins with such knowledge.
Note that nothing here contradicts my response to the previous objection. I can
glimpse the existence of this eternal four-dimensional perspective, and the power of the
formal geometric representation of this perspective provides powerful reasons for
accepting it as the best available account of the fundamental nature and structure of space
and time. However, I am still a being within space-time and as such, I have a determinate
past and an indeterminate future, given that I exist within an appropriate space-time. To
really see what is going on here we need to move up at least one level of abstraction.
I suggested above (§2) that the alternative to the theory of temporality developed
here is a radical Parmenidean or neo-Eleatic conception. Moreover, in the second
objection above, we can almost hear the shade of Parmenides or Zeno pointing out that if
we try to fudge, we only end up with nonsense. However, the first objection has almost
the same structure; here the defenders of radical becoming, the neo-Heracliteans, are
pushing an equally strong objection to compromise from the other direction. If the neo-
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Eleatics refuse to admit anything temporal to the universe, the neo-Heracliteans are
equally adamant in refusing admittance to anything atemporal.
However, it is perfectly clear, going back to the responses to the original Eleatics
that compromise is possible. Formally, the move advocated here is precisely the response
of the neo-Ionian physicists, the ancient Atomists and, most importantly, Aristotle in
response to the original Eleatic arguments of Parmenides and Melissus. Loosely, a neo-
Ionian four element physicist, such as Anaximander, accepts as equally real both a chair’s
coming into existence through changes in the relationship between the essentially
changeless and atemporal elements and the changeless and atemporal nature of those
elements.16
For our purposes, though, Aristotle made the crucial move when he engaged
directly with the problem of temporality, distinguishing it from the related problem of
change that had preoccupied earlier Greek philosopher-scientists. As is well known,
Aristotle defines time as "the quantity associated with change." This definition hardly
bears repeating except for an important aspect of Aristotle's theory of change regularly
overlooked in this context. Change, for Aristotle, is fundamentally the combination of
Forms, themselves essentially timeless and changeless, with Matter, itself incapable of
change, to generate substances. Thus, Aristotle is a realist about time although he does
not believe that the universe is temporal all the way down. More picturesquely but not too
inaccurately, given Aristotle's natural teleology, we can envision an Aristotelian universe
as the essentially temporal expression of the underlying atemporal reality in matter.
Of course, no contemporary theory of temporality which claims grounding in
modern physics, as this one does, can simply take over Aristotle's account of change and
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temporality: our physics is not Aristotle's. However, the theory presented above deserves
to be called neo-Aristotelian in the following sense. The modern description of space-
time, and thus the universe, as fields distributed on a four-dimensional differential
manifold, provides a so-called “God's Eye view,” a glimpse of being qua being sub
specie aeternitas. In this, it provides a perspective not dissimilar to that of theoria in
Aristotle’s philosophy. But it is equally true, whether on Aristotle’s account or mine, we
and the things around us are not eternal. To particular beings within space-time, including
but not limited to human beings, certain other beings are causally accessible and others
are not; are determinate or indeterminate; are past, future or neither
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Notes
1 Mauro Dorato (Dorato 1995) is almost the sole exception here.
2 On one level, it might seem simpler here to speak simply of points and regions of space-
time. However, part of the point of the section is that this space-time perspective slots
quite nicely into a schema, which allows for other types of contexts and dates. The
terminology of dates is comes from D. H. Mellor’s work although I use it here differently
than he does.
3 In the remainder of this section, quotation marks are used according to usual use-
mention distinction.
4 For a more complete discussion of the issues here see Chapter 3 of (Harrington 1998).
5 For clocks see the classic studies published as (Hafele 1972; Hafele and Keating 1972;
1972). On particle decay see (Rossi and Hall 1941).
6 This objection parallels that in Grünbaum and in earlier responses to Reichenbach’s
program.
7 For a discussion of the connection between problems of computability and predictive
determinism see (Earman 1986).
8 Perhaps the clearest example of the failure to distinguish predictive determinacy from
other forms is Karl Popper’s The Open Universe (Popper 1991).
9 I would like to thank an anonymous referee from The British Journal for the Philosophy
of Science for encouraging me to discuss this here.
10 This distinction between sentence-operators and predicate-operators comes from (Prior
and Fine 1977). Prior, however, assumes that sentence and predicate operators track each
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other, e.g. ~P⇔NP. There does not seem to be any particular reason not to waive this
requirement when it is useful.
11 I develop this in somewhat more detail in (Harrington 1998) and plan to develop this in
more detail in the future.
12 But, see (Tooley 1997)
13 For this particular purpose these two formulations are equivalent. The point here does
not depend, as far as I can tell, on ones metaphysical commitments on the nature of
temporally extended things.
14 The fact that classical gravitation is not only instantaneous, but also universal has
serious consequences for the actual application of these methods since this implies that
all actual affine geodesics are empty since there is no actual inertial motion. See (Torretti
1996) especially Chapter 1, for a careful discussion of this subtle problem.
15 The only philosopher I am aware of who has come close to making this point is Sir
Karl Popper in his book The Open Universe(1991). However, Popper formulates his
conception of indeterminism in terms of predictability, which camouflages the objective
character of the distinction. It also does not allow him to make the critical distinction
between ontological and relational indeterminacy.
16 For the Eleatics and the Ionian and Atomist response see especially (Barnes 1982). This
interpretation of this important moment in the history of philosophy is certainly not
without its problems. It is, however, clearly plausible, and more importantly serves to
illustrate a theoretical move which I am making. Whether or not, the relevant pre-
Socratics actually made it.
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